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Book Reviews 
Michel Foucault and the Subversion of Intellect by Karlis Racevskis. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1983. Pp. 172. $19.50. 
Michel Foucault: Social Theory as Transgression by Charles C. Lemert and 
Garth Gillian. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. Pp. xv + 169. 
$14.95. 
Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics by Hubert L. Dreyfus 
and Paul Rabinow. Second Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1983. Pp. xxvii + 271. $8.95 (paper). 
The appearance within the space of twelve months of two new books on 
Foucault, along with the revised and expanded second edition of a third (the 
original edition had been published only a year and a half previous), testifies 
to the validity of one of Foucault's most cherished theses: the power of dis-
courses to proliferate and to produce lateral affiliations across the disciplines 
of knowledge, and thereby to unify in a single discursive field a wide variety 
of problems and topics that appear otherwise to occupy separate compart-
ments. The five authors represent, respectively, French literature, sociology, 
philosophy (twice), and anthropology-a fair sampling of the human sci-
ences that Foucault has made the principal object of his research. It is per-
haps significant that none of the authors hails from that quarter of the 
disciplinary map which Foucault has consistently maintained as his home 
base: history. Since it will be my claim against these books that they are in-
sufficiently historical, in a somewhat old-fashioned sense of the term, it is 
surely worth pausing for a moment over the concept of history that animates 
Foucault's work. 
Foucault has consistently drawn attention to the lateral affiliations among 
discourses within a given epoch or social formation. His originality has con-
sisted in an almost uncanny ability to discover significant connections and 
junctures between widely dispersed institutions and practices: for example, 
the similarity among the disciplinary practices in the schools, the army, and 
prisons in what he has dubbed the carceral society. It is just this apparent 
heterogeneity within a conceptual problematic that makes the unifying 
power of a discursive regime so effective. The unity of the historical field 
does not lie in the replication of an epistemological paradigm across all the 
disciplines and practices in a period; it consists, rather, in the affiliative struc-
ture of different practices reinforcing each other at crucial points: for instance, 
the intersection between the systems of education and penology in delin-
quency, the productive conjuncture that subjects individuals to the disciplines 
of school and prison while maintaining the separation between the two insti-
tutions for the majority of their respective inhabitants. Foucault's evasiveness 
about the nature of the social whole notwithstanding, the unity of social 
practices is precisely what characterizes for him the political effectiveness of 
modern social fonnations. As Karlis Racevskis puts it, somewhat tenden-
tiously (but not, I think, inaccurately): "power-knowledge strategies ... op-
383 
384 Criticism, Vol. XXVI, No.4: Book Reviews 
erate in a homeostatic field of forces within which the achievement of 
stability does not require the original impetus of a conscious purpose" (p. 
110). 
It is somewhat troubling, therefore, given the example of the subject of 
these studies, to find them so strikingly blinkered with respect to the adjacent 
discourses that make up the immediate material environment of Foucault's 
research project. There are, of course, references to some among Foucault's 
predecessors (Canguilhem, Bachelard, the Annales School of French histori-
ans) and contemporaries (AIthusser, Lacan, Derrida, Levi-Strauss), but almost 
without exception (Racevski's discussion of Lacan and Foucault is both his-
torically apt and methodologically useful), what emerges from these brief for-
ays into the genealogy of contemporary French intellectual life is an assertion 
of the uniqueness of Foucault's project, the special and unrepeatable brilli-
ance of his conceptual innovations, the virtual autonomy of the discursive 
practice of Michel Foucault. Whatever else one might say about such assess-
ments, they are at the least unfoucauldian. 
Take, for instance, the various claims to establish Foucault's difference 
from marxism-claims given some support by Foucault's own alternately glib 
and dismissive or coy pronouncements concerning marxist concepts of his-
tory and society. Dreyfus and Rabinow contend that Foucault's interpretive 
analytics of the relations between power and knowledge are "more radical" 
than marxism (or the conventional sociology of knowledge) by virtue of Fou-
cault's "reflections on Nietzsche" (p. 115), but it is nowhere made clear in 
what this radicalization of marxist theory and its concepts consists. Dreyfus 
and Rabinow make no reference to the extent marxist critiques of Foucault's 
work (Poulantzas and Lecourt, for example) which would give them a ready 
opportunity to substantiate their contention. I surmise that the difference 
they see between foucauldian and marxist conceptions of society hinges on 
the absolute refusal of totalization in the former. In commenting on Fou-
cault's understanding of the functioning of power, they write: "This is not a 
new form of functionalism. The system is not in any way in equilibrium; nor 
is it, except in the most extended of senses, a system. There is no inherent 
logic of stability. Rather, at the level of the practices there is a directionality 
produced from petty calculations, clashes of wills, meshing of minor inter-
ests .... This directionality has nothing inherent about it and hence it cannot 
be deduced. It is not a suitable object for a theory. It can, however, be ana-
lyzed, and this is Foucault's project" (pp. 187-88). If this description is cor-
rect (and it certainly has textual warrant in Foucault, notably in the famous 
"nominalist" characterization of power set out in The History of Sexuality), 
then the possibility of political calculation, which has been the foundation of 
marxist political practice from Lenin onward, is denied. Perry Anderson's re-
cent characterization of marxism as "the search for subjective agencies cap-
able of effective strategies for the dislodgement of objective structures" 
highlights the signal difference between marxist and foucauldian concepts of 
political practice: on a foucauldian account, no such thing as "effective strate-
gies for the dislodgement of objective structures" is possible, since the struc-
tural tendencies produced by the social whole are not" a suitable object for a 
theory." The Dreyfus-Rabinow account of Foucault thus deprives his work of 
its potential for political effectivity. 
I 
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Lemert and Gillan attempt to bend the stick back again in characterizing 
Foucault's project as a form of intellectual terrorism, shifting the ground from 
an analytical to an activist position: "Foucault's politics rest primarily on a 
destructive effort. He seeks to dismantle and decentralize the false unity of 
power, to struggle against the localization of power in techniques and tactics. 
However, behind this struggle there is no conception of a social rationality in 
which politics would become more than an act of negation" (p. 108). The 
connection of Foucault's thought to anarchism is clear (p. 91), as is his funda-
mental repudiation of marxist analytical concepts, notably class (p. 112). 
Lemert's and Gillan's analysis returns often to Foucault's relationship to Al-
thusser (pp. 4-5, 13-14, 35, 116-17), but the patent misrepresentation of al-
thusserian theory vitiates what might have been an important confrontation 
between Foucault's work and, not just any marxism, but specifically that 
marxism which Foucault himself has openly acknowledged as one of the de-
cisive points of orientation for his own concept of history. 
Foucault's quarrel with Althusser, and therefore with at least one variant of 
contemporary marxism, is less fundamental than Lemert and Gillan lead one 
to believe. In "Sur les fa«;ons d'ecrire l'histoire," Foucault maintained that his 
only difference with his teacher concerned the interpretation of Marx's posi-
tion within the history of political economy. Foucault believed (as he had said 
in Les Mots et les chases) that Marx did not achieve an epistemological break 
with Ricardo and classical political economy (as Althusser had claimed in Lire 
Ie Capital). But Foucault was quick to point out that with respect to the "his-
torical and political consciousness of men," Marx "introduced a radical 
break," and that "the marxist theory of society certainly _opened up an en-
tirely new epistemological field./I Foucault's opposition to marxism is better 
understood in terms of his exit from and continuing hostility toward the reF 
(and of course the existing socialist states, particularly in Eastern Europe) 
than as a repudiation of marxist theory tout court. 
When Karlis Racevskis quotes Foucault's characterization of marxism in Les 
Mots et les chases as akin to positivism in its "pre-critical analysis of what 
man is in his essence" and its "empirico-critical reduplication by means of 
which an attempt is made to make the man of nature, of exchange, or of dis-
course, serve as the foundation of his own finitude" (p. 62), or when he con-
trasts Foucault's concept of history to lithe transcendent or teleological status 
that Hegelian and Marxist approaches recognize" (p. 75), he can only have in 
mind those fonns of marxism against which Althusser has written with such 
force and deadly theoretical perspicacity: on the grounds of repudiating his-
toricism, there is nothing to choose between Foucault and althusserian marx-
ism. What remains most interesting in Racevskis's judicious account of 
Foucault's lacanian rethinking of the concept of the subject is its silent shad-
owing of the althusserian theory of ideology. Racevskis writes: "This basic 
process of socialization does not require an a priori subjectivity to be effec-
tive, it is always already in effect" (p. 104). Althusser says: "Individuals are 
always already subjects." Racevskis argues: liThe individualized subject of 
modem society is constantly held accountable to the system of the norm-
but he must first be made aware of his particular situation: he must realize it 
and admit it. The technique of confession has therefore been the most effec-
tive tool of social control in both the Christian and the secular legal traditions 
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... it leads the individual to recognize himself in the framework of his sub-
mission to the appropriate moral or judicial code" (p. 107). Althusser writes: 
"Assuming that the theoretical scene I have imagined takes place in the 
street, the hailed individual will turn around. By this mere one-hundred-and-
eighty-degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject. Why? Because he 
has recognized that the hail was 'really' addressed to him, and that 'it was 
really him who was hailed' (and not someone else)." Racevskis quotes Fou-
cault on the relations between dominating and dominated classes as "a recip-
rocal relation of production" and comments: "In a sense then, the class is as 
much a product of its strategy as the strategy is an inherent part of the class 
that finds itself in a position to dominate and exploit. This relation of class to 
strategy is precisely that of subject to discourse: the subject derives its reality 
from the discourse it enunciates just as a class is defined by the tactics in 
which it engages" (pp. 112-13). Althusser avers: "For if it is true that the 
ISAs represent the form in which the ideology of the ruling class must neces-
sarily be realized, and the form in which the ideology of the ruled class must 
necessarily be measured and confronted, ideologies are not 'born' in the ISAs 
but from the social classes at grips in the class struggle: from their conditions 
of existence, their practices, their experience of the struggle, etc./I 
Absent from all three of these accounts of Foucault is a sufficiently detailed 
and rather conventionally historical sense of the affiliations between Fou-
cault's writings and the theoretical and political scenes of contemporary 
French intellectual life. The least historical account is Dreyfus's and Rabi-
now's, the most Lemert's and Gillan's (though its history often errs in detail), 
but it is Racevskis's book, which takes seriously many of the objections 
raised against Foucault (notably by Baudrillard), that constructs the most 
solid foundation upon which to build a genuinely historical and critical ac-
count of Foucault's work. I have suggested already that one of the silences in 
Foucault's discourse to be read symptomatically involves the subtext of AI-
thusser's theoretical labor over the concepts of history and ideology. Another 
place at which this discourse can be prised open to reveal its continuing con-
tact with other powerful theoretical projects on the present horizon is indi-
cated by Racevskis's shrewd characterization of the threat Foucault poses to 
business as usual among intellectuals. "It is in its rejection of any form of clo-
sure that Foucault's approach poses a threat to any system that maintains it-
self because its truths are taken seriously as authentic representations of the 
Real" (p. 138). The rejection of the possibility of theoretical closure travels 
under a famous name these days: Derrida. It would be a characteristic error 
of just that sort against which Foucault, Derrida, and Althusser have all 
warned, to monumentalize these discourses by personifying them as the ex-
clusive property of one or another individual. One strategy for avoiding this 
trap would be to read the texts associated with these (and some other) names 
as symptoms of a mutation in the theoretical problematic of contemporary 
knowledges, as an emergent epistemological break with the still largely hege-
monic concepts of historicism and humanism. I doubt that Foucault himself 
would have objected in principle to such a strategy. If, as Karlis Racevskis 
argues, Foucault's relation to contemporary intellectuals is metonymic, the 
appointed task of foucauldian commentators remains to identify the struc-
tures of adjacency that Foucault's discourse produces and is produced by. 
J 
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They could do worse than to begin which Foucault's relation to actually ex-
isting marxism, rather than taking as their object a phantom theoretical sys-
tem that perhaps never really existed in the first place. One legacy of 
Foucault's work may be to reopen what so many post- and anti-rnarxists 
wish to close down for good: the debate over how to read the texts of Marx. 
SUNY -Stony Brook Michael Sprinker 
Jane Austen: New Perspectives, edited by Janet Todd. Women & Literature, 
New Series, Volume 3. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1983. 
Pp. 293, $39.50. 
"Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any human disclo-
sure," writes Jane Austen in Emma, her novel of interpretive snafus; "seldom 
can it happen that something is not a little disguised or a little mistaken" 
(Chapman ed., 431). Austen's observation might well apply to this cautious 
collection of essays, and to Austen criticism generally. Tellingly, three of the 
essayists here cite the Emma passage; the anthology's collective energy co-
alesces in an effort to uncover an epistemology-a mode of knowing-in the 
Austen canon. That no epistemology emerges, or rather, that to the extent 
that one does emerge it is an epistemology of relativism, pluralism, and con-
ciliation, underwrites the anthology's conclusion: we will continue to ask 
questions about Jane Austen (was she a prim lady or a feminist? a conserva-
tive plumping for the status quo or a Jacobin iconoclast? a moral philosopher 
or a subversive ironist?) and we will continue to hedge our bets by answering 
"all of the above." 
Jane Austen: New Perspectives challenges the old perspectives on Austen 
more than it showcases entirely new ones. What is fresh, however, and thus 
makes this anthology an interesting and important addition to the Austen 
bibliography, is the extent to which many of the essays are self-consciously 
metacritical. Whether Austen herself was an orthodox anti-Jacobin has been 
disputed, hotly so since the 1975 publication of Marilyn Butler's Jane Austen 
and the War of Ideas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), but certainly her critics 
have been themselves, in the main, staunchly conservative and assiduously 
afraid to chisel too forcefully at those fragile bits of ivory lest they shatter. 
And while Austen's work has been examined through the prism of late eigh-
teenth-century popular culture and Romantic social and aesthetic values, no 
systematic analysis of socioeconomic ideology and its incursions into the 
Austen oeuvre existed until Mary Poovey's recent groundbreaking study, The 
Proper Lady alld the Woman Writer: Ideology as Style in the Works of Mary Wall-
stollecraft, Mary Shelley, and Jane Austell (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 
1984). Janet Todd's collection of essays, conscious of the staid nature of the 
Austen critical industry's past, signals a movement beyond polite New Criti-
cism and toward opening the well-rehearsed historicist and textual disputes 
to a more risk-taking critical discourse. 
Most of the essays in Todd's collection question their own undertaking 
even as they propose new interpretive contexts. Alistair M. Duckworth op-
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poses a closed system of historical criticism (a camp in which he situates his 
own work) with what he calls the openness of suspicious, anachronistic criti-
cism in "Jane Austen and the Conflict of Interpretations," Approaches to 
Austen's work, and to disagreements about it, depend, Duckworth proposes, 
upon the "pre-understandings" we bring to bear and the ways in which the 
"overdeterminedness" of Austen's novels promotes the indetenninacy of 
meaning we may locate in them. Duckworth concludes that "the tendency of 
historical criticism, especially when it works in alliance with modes of rhetor-
ical and thematic analysis, to close Austen's meanings, to seek to provide a 
complete and true definition of her vision, should be viewed with reserva-
tions" (48). David Spring responds as a social and economic historian to the 
varying and conflicting contexts from which Austen's work has been inter-
preted, and in "Interpreters of Jane Austen's Social World: Literary Critics 
and Historians," Spring offers a fresh view of class and of social fluidity in 
the Austen oeuvre. In "Emma and its Critics: The Value of Tact," Joel Wein-
sheimer uses Gadamer's terminology of interpretation to speculate about the 
applicability of the Kantian idea of judgment to Emma. From a quite different 
starting point, Weinsheimer also weighs disagreements among Austen critics, 
disputes the possibility of an absolute, authoritative interpretation of Aus-
ten's novels and, in claiming that "context-free neutrality" is impossible in 
the critical enterprise, argues for a hermeneutic circle, a dialogue between 
Austen's time and our own. 
Other essays in this collection also overlay readings of Austen's fiction 
with surprising sources. In "Two Faces of Emma," Avrom Fleishman applies 
Freudian notions of projection, mediated desire, and repetition to present a 
psychopathology of Emma which concludes that she is a functional neurotic 
and repressed homosexual. Nina Auerbach, in "Jane Austen's Dangerous 
Charm: Feeling as One Ought about Fanny Price," compares Austen's most 
uncongenial heroine to Wordsworth's leech-gatherer, Coleridge's Ancient 
Mariner, Byron's Childe Harold, Mary Shelley's Victor Frankenstein, and Ma-
turin's Melmoth as well as to Grendel-a picture gallery of Romantic out-
casts. Fanny, in this view, is a feminized, Romantic type of Hamlet, a 
monster and marginal creature, "a killjoy, a blighter of ceremonies and divi-
der of families" (211). Janet Todd reads Austen according to Virginia Woolf, 
seeing Austen's descendent as a victim of the anxiety of influence, threatened 
by and defensive about her precursor, in "Who's Afraid of Jane Austen?" 
While Todd looks forward, two of the essays retrieve elements of Austen's 
precursors in her works. In "The Burden of Grandison: Jane Austen and Her 
Contemporaries," Edward Copeland wittily returns to "the Golden Age of 
female domestic felicity" (98) he finds in the cedar parlor of Richardson's 
Grandison Hall and argues that the coherence of social vision there repre-
sented was no longer available to Austen and, indeed, that frightening 
changes in the economy and in concepts of the family prompted Austen-
and Charlotte Smith, Mary Wollstonecraft, Fanny Burney, and Maria Edge-
worth-to ground their fictions on the wreckage of family structure. Jocelyn 
Harris looks even farther backward for Austen's ancestors and glosses Anne 
Elliott's "the pen has been in their hands" remark in Persuasion with Chau-
cer's Wife of Bath's stout declaration-
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By God! if wommen hadde writen stories, 
As clerkes han withinne hire oratories, 
They walde han writen of men moore wikkedness€, 
Than al the mark of Adam may redresse. (273)-
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in "Anne Elliott, the Wife of Bath, and Other Friends," an essay that traces 
the "density of allusion" (288) in Persuasion to claim that overlaying the tem-
plate of earlier works on Austen's may enrich our readings of her novels. 
Two essays draw original conclusions through analyses of Austen's linguis-
tic and stylistic virtuosity. Zelda Boyd, in "The Language of Supposing: 
Modal Auxiliaries in Sense and Sensibility," dissects Austen's predilection for 
balanced verbal pairs and finds there a proof of Austen's strong sense of the 
circumstantial and of the language of judgment. Angela Leighton, also con-
centrating on Sense and Sensibility in "Sense and Silences: Reading Jane Aus-
ten Again," brilliantly argues that the drama of language in Austen's novels 
revolves around what Lacan calls the "not-said/' the fragmentary fictions 
that could not be written. Silence, Leighton claims, lies on the other side of 
control and when Marianne, after receiving Willoughby's letter of repudia-
tion, "almost screamed with agony," the sounds she does not make contrast 
with the public speech that describes her situation. "If the literary work is 
read as a palimpsest," writes Leighton, "where the surface text conceals and 
half reveals another, less obvious text, or where the narrative is deliberately 
complicated by secrets and enigmas, things unsaid and voices unheard, we 
may begin to hear in these Silences the sounds of women 'knocking'" (131). 
The crux of this anthology of and about critical disagreements lies perhaps 
in the juxtaposition of three essays that offer readings -of Mansfield Park 
through Fanny Price. Fanny has long presented a puzzle for Austen readers: 
what can we make of this least likeable of characters in her creator's least 
charming book? Nina Auerbach starts with Fanny's very marginality and 
reads her as "the controlling spirit of anti-play" (211), a counteractor in a 
book in which Austen "force[s] us to experience the discomfort of a Romantic 
universe presided over by the potent charm of a charmless heroine who was 
not made to be loved" (221). Marylea Meyersohn argues that Mary Brunton's 
Self Control lies behind Mansfield Park and that Fanny, a Griselda type and "a 
prefiguration of the Angel in the House" (226) is in flight from and strangled 
by speech in contrast to the novel's consummate talker and letter-writer, 
Mary Crawford. Fanny listens in a novel whose "central tension" is the 
"process of deferral" (224), writes Meyersohn in "What Fanny Knew: A 
Quiet Auditor of the Whole." In "Feminist Irony and the Priceless Heroine of 
Mansfield Park," Margaret Kirkham sees Fanny as an ironized conduct-book 
heroine and connects Austen to a rational, post-Enlightenment feminist mor-
alism in the tradition of a Wollstonecraft and Mill. These related but metho-
dologically and thematically utterly different views of Fanny complement the 
essays on critical cacaphony among Austenites by Duckworth, Spring, and 
Weinsheimer. 
Other essays in this collection include Joan Austen-Leigh's biographical 
speculation, "The Austen Leighs and Jane Austen or 'I have always main-
tained the value of Aunts' "; Margaret Kirkham's study of visual representa-
tions of Austen and the way they contributed to her Victorian stereotyping as 
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a prim old-maid, "The Austen Portraits and the Received Biography"; Jane 
Nardin's "Children and their Families in Jane Austen's Novels," a psycholog-
ical study of the structure of adoptive and surrogate families; David Mona-
ghan's attempt to reconcile apparent disagreements among Austen critical 
factions in "The Complexity of Jane Austen's Novels/'; Katrin R. Burlin's ap-
plication of the notion of ut pictura poesis in "'Pictures of Perfection' at Pem-
berley: Art in Pride and Prejudice"; and two interesting studies of ways of 
knowing and perspective in Austen, Martha Satz's "An Epistemological Un-
derstanding of Pride and Prejudice" and Mark M. Hennelly, Jr.'s "Pride and 
Prejudice: The Eyes Have It." 
Jane Austen's famed attention to detail has been matched by her interpret-
ers here, who pay as close attention to her syntax and to her asides as she 
did to ribbons and hat-trim. A handful of these critics present authentically 
fresh perspectives on Austen's novels (especially Leighton and Auerbach) or 
raise provocative questions about the enterprise of understanding her (espe-
cially Duckworth and Spring). Oddly, in a collection none of whose pieces 
takes on Austen's most parodic work, her Juvenilia and Northanger Abbey, 
this anthology on the whole views Austen as a consummate artificer, a delib-
erate and near-duplicitous manipulator of narrative and character. Taken to-
gether, these essays argue for both relativism and pluralism in Austen studies 
by claiming both that the richly textured novels will never yield absolute, 
single, trustworthy meanings and that the criticism about Austen will con-
tinue to spawn disagreement and to splinter into ever-renewing camps. 
Drexel University Julia L. Epstein 
Bread and Circuses: Theories of Mass Culture as Social Decay by Patrick Bran-
tlinger. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Pp. 307. $25.00 
Patrick Brantlinger has taken one of the key questions repeatedly asked by 
social critics: is post-industrial popular culture an opiate of the people or rep-
resentative of their hopes and desires? He focuses upon the "negative classi-
cists," i. e., social commentators from both the right and the left who argue 
that mass culture is clear evidence of the decay of modern society. Brantlin-
ger does not give us his own theory of mass culture, but rather presents with 
admirable clarity a wide range of writers who have seen modern society and 
its "benefits" as signs of the decline of true civilization. His book is a valu-
able analysis of attitudes toward not only mass culture, but also theories of 
social order, utopian (and dystopian) possibilities and the connections be-
tween literature and politics. 
Brantlinger has avoided such hackneyed dualisms as high culture vs, low 
culture, right vs. left, uplift vs. degeneration. By concentrating on a single 
classical image-bread and circuses-he has instead brought together a rich 
harvest of contradictions, hopes and fears. The relevance of his study for the 
present-day is obvious: 
i 
i 
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As Rome was both the zenith and burying ground of ancient civiliza-
tion, so modem mass society with its mass culture is both the zenith 
and nadir of modern progress, acme and end of the line for the "dual 
revolutions" of industrialization and democratization. Or so the nega-
tive classicists either fear or hope. (p. 35» 
After surveying classical beliefs about social decay and the masses, Brantlin-
ger effectively examines the pervasiveness of these attitudes in such nine-
teenth-century authors as Hegel. Matthew Arnold, Tennyson, Marx, 
Nietzsche, Zola, George Moore and William Morris. Obviously he has had to 
be selective in his choice of twentieth-century critics, hut Brantlinger keeps 
his main thesis clearly in mind as he wends his way through the thicket of 
such symptomatic thinkers as Freud, Ortega y Gasset, T. S. Eliot, Adorno, 
Horkheimer, and their lesser followers of the present day. 
Brantlinger's approach enables him to look freshly at a variety of authors, 
reminding us of the richness and complexity of cultural analysis. He argues, 
for example, that the Decadents at the end of the nineteenth century reacted 
against progressivism by declaring all empires doomed: "They even seemed 
to be hastening the decline and fall by imitating the decadent Romans and by 
cultivating linguistic corruptions and eccentricities, like magical incantations 
against the powers-that-be" (p. 126). While ancient decadence is praised, 
modem decadence, based upon industry and machinery, is condemned. In 
these circumstances, we can better understand the search for the primitive 
made by an optimistic socialist such as William Morris. His Icelandic sagas, 
revival of crafts and utopian fiction were all an effort to invigorate modem 
society through primitivism. If decadent Rome had been ·revitalized by the 
barbarian hordes, so too could modem Britain be. Ironically, as Brantlinger 
notes, the end result of Morris's efforts was often a form of decadent escap-
ism. Yet this should not be our final judgment of the arts and crafts move-
ment, which-like the Frankish and German conquerors of Rome-revived 
and retained the best of the old. Without the arts and crafts movement, we 
might have lost the best of Victorian design. 
Brantlinger avoids simple conclusions, and is at his best in presenting the 
complexities of his chosen authors. For example, he recognizes the subtle im-
perialism underlying Conrad's African tales, while admitting the anti-imperi-
alism of Kipling. Albert Camus is linked with two conservatives, Ortega and 
Eliot, to compare effectively the ways in which the same images drawn from 
classical literature can be used peSSimistically or optimistical1y. Camus, rather 
than projecting a dying culture, looked back nostalgically to the simple Greek 
man, who might be a model for an anti-nationalist, pan-Mediterranean cul-
ture. Insights such as these will give specialists new ways to look at specific 
authors and literary movements. 
Some of Brantlinger's most acute comments are about television, and the 
simplified criticism (or defensive praise) it has received. As he points out, 
"The mass media are the most powerful instruments ever invented for the 
dissemination of civilization; they are also frequently declared to be the tool 
of our cultural suicide" (p. 35). Brantlinger's final two chapters examine this 
paradox in some depth, starting with the pessimistic prognostications o( 
Theodor Adorno and his Frankfurt Institute. Marxists were as likely as reli-
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gious conservatives such as Eliot and Jacques Ellul to fear and distrust the 
masses. Watching the destruction of social democracy in Weimar Germany, 
Adorno saw hope only in "the forces set free by decay," harking back again 
to the barbarian hordes that overran Rome. Unfortunately Brantlinger does 
not take the opportunity here to examine why the upper-class intelligentsia 
put its hope in some future "barbarian horde," whereas intelligent working 
men placed their hope in organized collective political action. The class and 
political implications of the "bread and circuses" metaphor might have been 
explored more fully. Theories of social decay rarely come from working peo-
ple-the masses themselves-but rather are a product of disillusioned intel-
lectuals of the left or right. 
After the Frankfurt School, Marshall McLuhan and a variety of American 
commentators are easily disposed of; Brantlinger is acute and accurate in his 
puncturing of McLuhan's airy generalizations about "global villages" and the 
"Gutenberg galaxy." But such easy targets leave him little room for his own 
analysis. Indeed, Brantlinger's very ability to present complex ideas and re-
sponses has led him to bury his own best ideas. Bread and Circuses is an im-
portant examination of the ways in which major social thinkers have used 
the experience of classical Rome and Greece to analyze their own societies. It 
provides an important new look at the ways we have conceptualized and 
argued about mass culture. But it does not offer a new theory itself. Perhaps 
it is unfair to ask Brantlinger to do so, but he has so intelligently pinpointed 
the weaknesses and strengths of past critics; surely, he can speak out about 
his own attitudes toward the function of television in our culture, of the na-
ture of a consumer-culture, and of the strange pervasiveness of those classical 
images of decay and rebirth that appear so tenaciously in a culture seemingly 
far from Rome. 
University of Michigan Martha Vicinus 
The Land Before Her: Fantasy and Experience of the American Frontiers, 
1630-1860 by Annette Kolodny. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1984. Pp. 293. $28.00-9.95 PB. 
In this sequal to The Lay of the Land, Annette Kolodny presents the female 
alternative to the male fantasies described in the earlier book, and she suc-
cessfully demonstrates that the study of colonial, federal and ante-bellum 
American literature has suffered from the unwarranted exclusion of women's 
writings about the experience of frontier settlement. She examines canonized 
(or tentatively canonized) writers such as Margaret Fuller and Mary White 
Rowlandson, but she does not restrict herself to them, preferring to chart the 
genre at large, introducing (for the first time, in several cases) writers who 
deserve but have not received serious aesthetic attention. She does not resort 
to blaming a willfully male exclusionary bias because she has a better ground 
for her assertions-her ability to read closely, sympathetically and imagina-
tively texts that might otherwise strike the reader as uneventful. This talent is 
evident, for example, when, having depicted several women's reluctance to I 
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uproot and move west, Kolodny speculates that captivity narratives such as 
those of Rowlandson and Hannah Dustin offered a disguised, socially per-
missable articulation of the reluctance to relocate: for Native American cap-
tor, read husband. Her speculation cannot be demonstrated either way, but 
Kolodny's thesis nevertheless accords with certain resonances in her texts, 
and suggests an explanation for the captivity narratives' continuing popular-
ity among American women. The Land Before Her is good teaching, setting a 
standard of careful speculative reading that discovers the strengths of over-
looked works. 
Kolodny's overarching polemical theses, however, are less persuasive than 
her page-to-page exegetical practice. She is not content with the conclusion 
that her explications yield, that these are unusually candid and noteworthy 
books. She also wishes to constitute her texts theoretically, as a single, dis-
tinct and coherent entity in sharp contrast with the male texts from the same 
period. In her preface, Kolodny claims both that she is describing a tradition 
and that she is writing a revisionist history. If the term tradition implies a con-
scious adoption and adaptation of extant literary conventions, Kolodny has 
not proved that these books comprise a tradition. Though in some cases she 
does show that one of the writers was familiar with another's book, she does 
not convincingly demonstrate a group consciousness of genre. Sometimes she 
equivocates on this, such as when she contends that an episode in Mary Je-
mison's life story is "reminiscent of Rowlandson" (73), thereby implying 
without asserting a conscious literary indebtedness. 
The case for a revisionist history is stronger because it does not require that 
the underlying coherence of the texts be explicitly present as the writers' hy-
pogrammatic intentions, but it raises problems in its turri. Without the con-
cept of group self-consciousness, Kolodny must look elsewhere for the source 
of the texts' unity. She cannot appeal to the writer's common physical envi-
ronments, because men lived in the same terrains. Near the end of her intro-
duction, she seems to throw up her hands, hinting at "subconscious mental 
processes or biologically based urges" (12), but these brief suggestions do not 
become developed assertions. 
It is tempting to suggest that Kolodny should have abandoned her insist-
ence on the literary result of gender difference, because the contrast is 
strained at some points. For example, when the hermit-heroine of a 1788 al-
manac narrative displays the sort of violence Kolodny finds characteristic of 
male writing, Kolodny announces that the text "quietly subverts" or "alto-
gether supersedes" men's writing because the "male adventure is displaced 
by a narrative of female adventure" (60). One might say, however, that what 
is superseded is Kolodny's determination to maintain a polarity between 
masculine and feminine writing. 
But the contrast does not have to be discarded, only the desire to root it in 
psychological or biological gender absolutism. And in fact Kolodny's most 
credible thesis is historical: since women were "dispossessed of paradise," 
excluded from both practical decision-making and the imaginative expansive 
obsessions that frequently motivated decision making, they were compelled 
to make do with a limited sphere. But if this limitation was a captivity, it was 
also an escape: total personality was not restricted to the allure of egoist 
dominance. This thesis does not depend on the psychosomatics of gender, it 
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is less vulnerable to counterexamples, and it accounts for the common char-
acter of many of the texts Kolodny explicates. Unfortunately, it is incompati-
ble with a polemical intention Kolodny should have discarded. At the end of 
her introduction, Kolodny speculates that if women had led the western set-
tlement it would have been less violent and rapacious. But if the character of 
these writers was historically determined by the fact of their having been ex-
cluded from dominance, then there is no point in speculating on how things 
would have been different had they been dominant from the first. 
The fundamental problem with this book is Kolodny's utopian ambition-
her inclination to contend that the writers represent a kind of salvation from 
the nightmare of male history. Whereas men, according to Kolodny I fantasize 
a regime, women envision peaceable spaces that permit rich interchange 
among people and between people and nature-communities and gardens. 
But however much Kolodny's readings of the texts do discover these utopian 
strands, such redemptive potentialities rarely seem to be clear key-moments 
when the writer's commitment is maximally intense. Instead, the utopian 
strands are occasional topics, one element among others, rather than inten-
tional centers. Quite a few of the books discussed, in fact, do not display the 
paradisal imagination at all. Kolodny's close fidelity to the texts, in other 
words, is an adversary to her utopian polemical intention. If her reader 
senses that an overinsistent application of her polemical theses would be re-
ductive, this is because Kolodny has herself delineated the complexity of 
thought and emotion which surpasses such reductive theorization. 
There is a more satisfying celebration of these texts implicit in many of Ko-
lodny's individual readings, but it is not acknowledged in her polemical over-
tures. A crude epistemological relativism leads her to conclude that no one 
sees the land in itself: everyone only projects fantasies onto it; the writers 
presented in this book are distinct in projecting communitarianjecological 
fantasies, good ones rather than bad ones. Were this lumbering psychological 
commitment discarded, Kolodny might unveil the more modest but more du-
rable virtue hinted at throughout the book, especially in the chapter on Caro-
line Kirkland and in the contrast between Alice Cary and Caroline Soule-
realism. Many of the writers Kolodny describes do seem to pose an alterna-
tive to the conquering expansiveness described in The Lay of the Land (and to 
its deflationary antinomy, tall talk). This alternative, however, is not a uto-
pian potency, but instead fidelity, to objects as they are, rather than as sites 
of exploitation-seeds, sheds, yeast, brush, stumps-and to the actual com-
posite of emotions-fear, fatigue deprivation, contentment, loneliness, and so 
on. 
The University of California-Berkeley Mitchell Breitwieser 
Realism and Consensus in the English Novel by Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pp. 304. $25.00. 
Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth's Realism and Consensus in the English Novel is a 
, 
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bold project modestly pursued. As a consequence, the reader may be dis-
tressed or relieved by it, depending on how stringently she judges an au-
thor's obligations to fulfill the expectations stirred in the beginnings of a 
book. 
The first chapter does indeed stir many expectations, for Ermarth declares 
an interest in marking the nineteenth-century English novel as the culminat-
ing expression of a kind of thought first evinced in the Renaissance. Medieval 
historiography, narrative, painting and geometry, she argues, drawing on an 
already well established tradition of thought, were characterized by the per-
ceived discreteness of objects, valuation of the static and the prototypicat 
and contrasts between time and eternity rather than past and present. In con-
trast, the new episteme introduced by Renaissance geometry, historiography, 
narrative and painting encourages the assumption that "because objects have 
an invariant structure." general laws of relationship can be drawn from a lim-
ited number of cases (21). Similarities among the apparently dissimilar 
emerge in time and greater degrees of abstractness are achieved. Quattro-
cento painting is the most developed example of the new features of a linear 
realism with at least four implications: an increase in aesthetically revealed 
depth; the increased significance of the spectator and its position; "a potential 
equality among viewpoints" (20); and the creation of a common horizon of 
perception. To connect the realistic novel to this episteme, the author draws 
analogies between it and quattrocento painting: "What the faculty of sight is 
to space, the faculty of consciousness is to time .... The linear coordinates in 
fiction (past, present, and future) operate like the spatial coordinates in paint-
ing (front, side, and back) to homogenize the medium in which consensus 
becomes possible" (40). 
Ermarth's precise and helpful discussions of the roles of past tense narra-
tion, memory, and narrative sequencing of simultaneous events ably justify 
the analogy between the coordinates of fiction and painting. But the premise 
of the book, the definition of realism as a form that relies on the possibility 
or hope for consensus, is elusive. This elusiveness is partly the result of the 
multiple meanings of consensus in the works of the authors discussed. Per-
suasion is a somewhat realistic text because in it the narrator, unlike the 
corrective narrator of Emma, corroborates and consents to the protagonist's 
mind. Furthermore, towards the end of the novel Anne Elliot and Captain 
Wentworth effect an alternative to social disorder, rather than Emma's and 
Knightley's entrance into social order, by meeting one another's minds and 
thus constructing consensus. In Our Mutual Friend consensus emerges 
through the clarifying similarities in the identity crises of such characters as 
Eugene Wraybum and John Harmon and it is also an atmosphere the narra-
tive strives to create by linking the various worlds of the characters through 
the repeated images of the river and the dust mounds. 
The initial historical breadth of the book is justified by Ermarth's theoreti-
cal task, but as the book progresses from three theoretical chapters to chap-
ters on individual authors, history is virtually omitted and the theoretical 
enterprise considerably narrowed. Elaborate concentration on strategies for 
obtaining consensus or the illusion of consensus in particular texts supplants 
any possibility of consideration of the project of consensus at a time of enor-
mous social change. The fragility of consensus is constantly asserted, along 
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with the difficulty facing the reader who assembles all the elements of a long 
work in order to perceive its unifying concepts and the common world held 
in bounds by the medium created by the narrator. But the social and histori-
cal reasons why consensus may escape are articulated only as questions of 
form. For instance, the theoretical premise that there is a potential equality 
among viewpoints because the narrator collects perspectives of a diverse 
population is not given the attention it requires if consensus is indeed seen as 
an historical task, as the aspiration of an episteme. Such unexamined accep-
tance of a liberal concept leads to readings that casually ignore the question 
of why, for instance, of all the characters in Our Mutual Friend, it is the reso-
lution of the crises of the two gentlemen, John Harmon and Eugene Wray-
bum, that the author correctly adjudges as essential to the imagination of 
consensus. Furthermore, though the author's initial intent is to characterize 
an episteme and a genre, only highly selected texts are shown to enforce the 
theory. No reference is made to minor authors or other coexistent forms, 
such as sentimental fiction. Consequently, a major opportunity to test hy-
potheses and historical generalizations is evaded. Canonized texts are given 
priority in the hierarchy of indications of a social world that may not be so 
easily assimilated to even formal consensus. 
There are many indications that the author is aware of the limits of her 
project and the other questions that might be asked. She has defined her 
task, for good reasons, so as to exclude them. As a consequence, questions 
about the canon and the status of characters who direct consensus dispropor-
tionately may seem impertinent to this particular work. Such questions are 
not designed to undermine the achievement of this work that does indeed 
contribute greater theoretical depth to a number of authoritative readings of 
the texts examined. Instead, they are questions about the ability of this genre 
of literary criticism to embrace even a minimally inclusive definition of his-
tory. Curiously, the increasing obligation of literary critics published by dis-
tinguished presses to raise the theoretical stakes of their arguments may lead 
to the deployment of theory and history as simply another form of back-
ground. They become a way of making close readings look more important 
rather than a way of jolting literary criticism and close reading out of some of 
their complacencies in order to place the canon in history. They also become 
a way of recycling established and effective readings. The separation of theo-
retical chapters from chapters of close reading invokes a form of discourse 
that constrains an author from pausing to examine terms as they are applied 
to texts and to digress fruitfully into challenges to a thesis. 
Details that might shake the faith in consensus, a faith Ermarth states is es-
sential to reading the realistic text, actually are presented in an essay Ermarth 
contributed to a volume of essays on women in fiction. (Fictional Consensus 
and Female Casualty" in The Representation of Women in Fiction, eds. Carolyn 
G. Heilbrun and Margaret R. Higonnet, Johns Hopkins, 1983). There she dis-
cusses a number of heroines of realistic texts who must die because they can-
not be· assimilated to consensus. That such a theme is segregated in an 
appropriate volume and not included in the text under discussion is simply 
an instance of how faith in a thesis is constructed, an instance that shows 
that the premise of equality among viewpoints requires suspicion. Without 
challenging the efficacy of Ermarth's thesis about consensus, I would argue 
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that the potential depth of the study is limited by the topics that are avoided, 
as always. The text therefore announces its participation in the perceptual 
mode examined, for it yearns for consensus and is satisfied to prove it at the 
level of abstraction that formally enables the neglect of disproof. 
Vanderbilt University Mary Childers 
Literal Imagination: Blake's Vision of Words by Nelson Hilton. Berkeley: Univ. 
of California Press, 1983. Pp. xvii + 322 with 83 halftones. $30.00. 
On page 3 of Literal Imagination Nelson Hilton offers an "experiment" 
whereby plate 86 of Blake's Jerusalem, consisting of 64 lines with no design, 
is covered over except for a few words, mostly nouns, such as "Spectre," 
"fibres," and "looms." With less than 5% of the words visible, we are able to 
see that "each word signifies so amply that even so skeletal a structure be-
gins to bear (bare) meaning as each word finds relation to another. While this 
relational process occurs initially in the mind of the perceiver, it can develop 
through and toward structures in the "mind" of the text, and then further to 
relations in the "mind." or episteme, of English and collective imagination . 
. . . the words of the plates have their own plots." 
One must admire Hilton's nerve in beginning this way. Many readers will 
put down the book by page 4, not knowing that they have already under-
gone the worst, though hardly the last, of his experiments, and that there are 
solid and even conventional chapters ahead. Those brave enough to keep 
reading may be the only readers Hilton wants; he may be content to slough 
off the rest right away as too tightly locked up in conservative and "Urizen-
ic" notions to enjoy the expansive and antinomian critical playfulness he 
proposes. 
For playful he certainly is. The bear/bare pun is only one of hundreds, 
some of them in Blake (vale/veil, weep/sweep), some of them in Hilton 
(seam/seme), and many of them hovering somewhere in between, perhaps 
in the mind of English itself (change/chains, wrath/wreath/wraith, symme-
try jsee me try). There are also lots of anagrams, such as name/amen and 
earth/heart, and sub-anagrams like fire/fibre and amen/lamentation/gar-
ment. And there are long skeins of looser oral and visual associations, such 
as tyger/anger/gyre/fire, not to mention Blake's invented names, which 
seem to pack several words together. 
This is fun, and any playful reader may join the game. What are the rules? 
There seems to be only one. Look for links of any sort between two words, 
though not the narrative or syntactical or logical sort of links (for these 
chains must be broken), and then wherever one of the words recurs let the 
other one resonate with it. Each word will somehow mean the other, and 
both will mean all others that look or sound like either. Since "polysemy is 
always available, words and their meanings are always flying about," and we 
may fly about with them if our imaginations will allow us. 
What equipment is needed? Again only one thing, the Blake Concordance, 
"that valuable work." through whose "discourse" we may trace the trajecto-
]------------------------------------------------~ 
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ries of the flying word-worlds. I would add that a set of colored pencils 
ought to be helpful. 
What is the goal? To set the whole synchronous text of Blake vibrating on 
an infinite number of registers. And to have fun doing it. (The mind of the 
text should have fun doing it, too.) 
Anyone who doubts the satisfactions of so undisciplined a sport is put 
down as a Urizenic type, one of the parental killjoys Blake shows us in his 
Songs. "Such expanding cross-reference," Hilton says, "mocks the chains of 
criticism/' and no critic wants to be told he or she is in chains and then be 
mocked to boot. For some time there has been a cult of knowing playfulness 
among Blake scholars, and lately it has gotten a second wind from the fun 
new French theories. Hilton is now "it": catch him if you can. But solemn ad-
jurations about bedtime and washing up and doing homework are ruled out 
from the first. 
Unfortunately for Hilton, he is only half a child. He concedes that "chains, 
connections of some sort there will be undoubtedly be," and "there are links 
that cannot be broken while we are as we are," He hasl however, no basis 
whatever for specifying what these irreducible chains might be, or just what 
we are when we are as we are. When he invokes the high state of imagina-
tive freedom he is much vaguer than Blake. His methodolOgical statements 
all have to do with breaking traditional chains and creating as many new 
ones as we can think up, and we are given no rules for deciding which old 
ones to break and which new ones not to create. All chains are alike. Hilton 
has no way of knowing when enough is enough, when to tell the sorcerer's 
apprentice to stop fooling around and get to work. 
Take his comments on "London." He points out something I had never 
noticed, that the initial letters of stanza 3-
How the Chimney-sweepers cry 
Every blackning Church appalls, 
And the hapless Soldiers sigh, 
Runs in blood down Palace walls 
-spell "hear," which is the final word of the lines immediately before and 
after it. Hearing indeed dominates the poem. "We are urged to hear," Hilton 
says, "the soldier's sigh running in blood, while the chimney s/weeper's cry 
casts a pall over st. Paul's" (i.e., every blackning Church o'Paul's). In the 
poem's final word, "hearse," we hear its rhyme-word, "curse," but we see 
the word "hear" again, as we have been hearing and seeing it throughout. 
These are clever and interesting points, but there are difficulties. The 
speaker does not hear the sigh running or the cry appalling, in fact, but how 
they do so; it is almost as if the speaker hears about these things, though it 
remains true in both cases that a sound brings about a color-change. More 
important, "appalls" does not mean "casts a pall" but rather the opposite, 
"to make pale" (with fear or guilt), though the word "blackning" might itself 
suggest "pall." St. Paul's seems to be pulled out of a hat. 
If these objections are dismissible as Urizenic conservatisml one may ask 
why Hilton stops where he does. How about the harlot, of "the youthful 
Harlots curseU ? Surely in uharlotU we hear lots of curses. We also hear Loes 
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curse, which makes London into Sodam and the harlots into his daughters, 
who pass on an incestuous plague to their infants. Then there is Har, an im-
portant character and place in Blake, whose lot is to succumb to a marriage 
hearse. And if St. Paul's is part of the poem, how about St. Mark's, whose 
name appears three times in the first stanza? Hilton says that "the poem's 
self-unchaining does not, of course, usher the delighting reader into any 
realm of absolute free-play," but by his own rules we may keep up our mer-
riment until we drop dead and no one may tell us to stop. 
Hilton's other half, I am glad to say, wrote half the book, including thor-
ough and very helpful discussions of such key symbols as veils, spectres, 
fibres, stars, vortices, and polyps. He had to work on these, researching his-
torical sources and analogues, eighteenth-century physiology, and so on, and 
tracing with scholarly care what these symbols precisely meant. This half of 
the book makes a fine contribution to Blake studies, though Hilton's heart 
may not have been in it. 
The first half, taken in the right spirit, can also be useful, not only for its 
sometimes brilliant brainstorms but as a reminder that solemnity will not 
take you far in understanding Blake. Having loosened our mental manacles, 
then, Hilton ought to undertake the harder task of distinguishing good criti-
cal chains from bad, and coherencies from incoherencies in Blake himself. 
Coalition For a New Foreign and Military Policy Michael Ferber 
Deconstructive Criticism: An Advanced Introduction, by Vincent B. Leitch. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Pp. xii. $25.00. 
We have been for about a year now in the midst of a minor flurry of books 
and articles that explain, paraphrase, contextualize, or otherwise account for 
deconstruction. For reasons that are slightly mysterious, these attempts seem 
to fall into two categories: synchronic elucidations that are sympathetic (e. g., 
Culler's On Deconstruction) and historical evaluations that are disparaging 
(Eagleton's Literary Theory: An Introduction). The opposition is still heated; 
deconstruction still causes us to take sides. But the net effect of this recent 
publication seems to be that we are getting used to deconstruction-which is 
rather like getting used to an angel in the drawing room. 
It is the greatest strength of Vincent Leitch's new book that it sustains the 
strangeness and difficulty of deconstruction while providing both a history 
and an elucidation, plausibly and sympathetically. The main strategy is to 
present an intertextual interpretation of critical trends, a story in which dis-
course speaks to discourse, book to book. Part I, "Semiology and Deconstruc-
tion: Modern Theories of the Sign," picks up the key terms and their 
theoretical freight from Husserl, Saussure, and Heidegger and places them in 
their contemporary usage and modification in Lacan, Levi-Strauss, and Der-
rida. This terminological/theoretical complex extends through Part II, "Ver_ 
sions of Textuality and Intertextuality: Contemporary Theories of Literature 
and Tradition," a careful documentation of the lines of force descending from 
Heidegger into recent structuralism and deconstruction. The contribution of 
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this central section is precisely to centralize "intertextuality" as the premier 
critical development of contemporary criticism. The final section, then, "Criti-
cal Reading and Writing: Strategies of Deconstruction/' depends in tum on 
particular variations of intertextuality to discriminate among current decon-
structive styles. 
Leitch describes his organization this way: "Patterned like a history of 
ideas, the book approximates a spiral as it regularly returns to significant con-
cepts, texts, and figures .... Occasionally, the text mimics the production of 
Penelope's tapestry, weaving a series of passages only to unstitch them later" 
(ix). The approach requires a lengthy exposition and, at first, a patient read-
ing (Part I is a cave of winds, or quotations-all the characters call to each 
other across the years, trying to be heard, or read, over the writing of Saus-
sure, Heidegger, and Derrida). But the terms gather weight, acquire a history, 
and the result is an understanding of deconstruction as an ongoing twentieth 
century project, with a renewed emphasis on the contemporaneity of the par-
ent figures. 
The treatment of Heidegger is exemplary. Heidegger's contributions to lit-
erary theory are often, by a huge irony, frozen into a fixed shape, as when 
we write of "Heidegger's contributions" as if he had some fixed number of 
discrete ideas; this is just the error of thought Heidegger discerned and re-
jected in other critics. Recent Heideggerians, Bove and Spanos especially, 
have argued that such "spatializing" (usually, of literature by formalist crit-
ics) misrepresents both the text and the experience of reading; their response 
is a "destructive" criticism that replaces literary structure with literary tem-
porality, an unfolding disclosure and concealment of truth. Leitch performs 
the same function for Heidegger by locating the many interpretations of Hei-
degger implicit in contemporary critical strategies. "Heideggerian phenome-
nology" is no longer a dead background (what Miller and de Man used to 
do, before Derrida) but a lively aspect of post-modern thinking. In fact, this 
central discussion informs much of the rest of the book, providing a terminol-
ogical anchor for succinct explanations of contemporary critical gestures: de 
Man's adventures in reading, Barthes' pursuit of a post-structuralist style of 
critical writing, and, chiefly, the multiplication of "undecidables" (ecriture, 
trace, border-they number "about three dozen," Leitch writes) in the work 
of Derrida, which Leitch describes as Derrida's joyfully Western pursuit of 
the "logic of the supplement"-the continual addition of just one more quali-
fication to a nearly complete disclosure of the truth (174-76). 
Leitch's prose style requires some attention, for it distinguishes his book 
from the several recent works on the same topic. A charge often laid to de-
construction is that it violates its own anti-Iogocentric preachments by con-
tinuing to make assertions. Leitch repeats often enough that it is not possible 
to write criticism outside the logocentric system; one must use the working 
language, rest on it, as the physicist must treat the floor as a solid surface. 
Nevertheless, Leitch chooses not to preserve all the conventions of argumen-
tative, empirical discourse. If in "space" the book is "spiral" and plural, in 
reading time it is allusive, accretive, and echoic. The style is conditional-of-
ten specifically subjunctive-but it does not sound equivocal. The effect is 
rather of modelling or construction, series of hypotheses and partial with-
drawals, or weavings and unweavings. We are not told to "regard" Of Gram-
d 
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matology as the prototypical deconstructive work, but to "imagine" it so 
(169). Instead of adducing a series of quotations, Leitch "cuts" a "mishmash 
of formulations" (172). For this, he invites the reader to "compensate me, 
and heap on one or more levels" (174). And more than once he formally 
cites his own words (notably, part of his "Prologue" appears as the epigraph 
of a later chapter (232). The following passage, from Leitch's characterization 
of "metacriticism/' suggests something of his procedure of rapidly deploying 
hypothesis, citation, apposition, and repetition; it also suggests another view 
of his own scholarly text: 
The scholar's text, the production of a deconstructed subject, some-
times of a libidinous "hysteric," disseminates meaning beyond truth or 
totalization. It is the birth of a frolicsome "science," a playful "herme-
neutics" of indeterminacy, reminiscent of Nietzsche's most visionary 
and aphoristic movements. Criticism catches up with and surpasses 
avant-garde literature. Perhaps. (224) 
Earlier, Leitch quotes Derrida on the question of whether deconstruction 
should oppose logocentJism from within, critiquing it in its own terms, or try 
to remove itself to some anarchic, anti-philosophic position; Derrida con-
cludes: 
A new writing must weave and interweave the two motifs. That is, sev-
eral languages must be spoken and several texts produced at the same 
time .... it is perhaps a change of style that we need. (179) 
This is a fair summary of Leitch's project. Deconstructive Criticism attempts to 
overwrite the misrepresentations of sequentiality, to keep' all the terms and 
their interrelations current at each moment, the whole dialectic close at hand. 
Leitch does not just argue intertextuality, he demonstrates it, and the result is 
convincing. 
Northern State College Terrance Riley 
